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Abstract
Is there a gender gap in Latin American attitudes toward women politicians? While
scholars of Latin America have examined the role of institutions and quotas in women’s
electoral success, less attention has been paid to voters’ attitudes about women lead-
ers. In this paper, we report on two survey experiments and an observational study
in Brazil looking at the effect of candidate gender on vote choice. We asked subjects
to chose a candidate from a hypothetical ballot while randomly varying candidates’
gender. We find a strong and consistent 5-7 percentage point pro-female bias. Our
experiments illustrate a novel approach to testing candidate choice models.
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1 Introduction
Recent presidential elections suggest that a transformation in gender politics is taking place
in Latin America, with women running for - and often winning - the presidency across
the region. Today, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina all have women presidents. In the past,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua have also had women leaders. In other coun-
tries, women are competing at the highest level, suggesting more changes in the future. The
incumbent party (PAN) in Mexico nominated a woman candidate in the last election. In
Chile, both front-runners in 2013-2014 cycle were women. In Peru, Keiko Fujimori nearly
defeated Ollanta Humala in 2011. The success of women at the highest levels suggests that
Latin America has made great strides in gender equality and has surpassed many developed
countries, including the United States.
However, there remain many troubling signs of inequality. On most social indicators,
women still struggle with less access to education, lower incomes, and lower rates of labor
force participation. Attitudes among many Latin Americans are still very traditional and
conservative, with many in public opinion surveys supporting the notion that “women’s
place is in the home”. Even more stunning, more than a quarter of Brazilians in a recent
study agreed that women who dress and act provocatively “deserve to be attacked and
raped”(IPEA, 2014). In the political sphere, there remains a contrast between the success of
women seeking national office, and their struggles in lower level competitions. While women
have made progress in Presidential elections, in most countries they continue to lag behind
men in legislative and local elections.
Most research focused on Latin America’s female politicians has analyzed the effective-
ness of quotas systems in helping women access elected positions (Baldez, 2004; Franceschet,
Krook and Piscopo, 2012; Htun and Jones, 2002; Jones, 1996, 1998, 2004, 2009; Jones and
Navia, 1999; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004). Conclusions from that literature focus on the
best institutions to bring about gender parity in representation. Yet legal prescriptions and
descriptive representation may be no substitute for deeper structural and social changes. For
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example, while Brazil requires that 30% of list candidates be women, only 10% of deputies
elected in 2014 were women.1 In addition, without attitudinal changes among voters, women
will always face additional challenges in their political advancement. Understanding the gen-
der gap in descriptive representation requires moving beyond institutions to also examine
attitudes, yet the literature on attitudes and gender is largely limited to developed democra-
cies (Dolan, 1997, 2010; Terkildsen, 1993; Lammers, Gordijn and Otten, 2009; McElroy and
Marsh, 2010; Philpot and Walton Jr, 2007; Sanbonmatsu, 2002).
In this paper we investigate gender bias in candidate choice in Brazil, using two experi-
ments and an observational study of election results. The two survey experiments measure
gender bias in candidate choice. In each, we ask subjects to choose a preferred candidate
from a list of hypothetical candidates for legislative office. In the first experiment we manip-
ulated the race and gender of three candidates on a hypothetical ballot. We find a significant
bias towards female candidates when comparing white male and female candidates, but the
effect is much smaller when comparing male and female black candidates. In the second
experiment, we focus on white candidates and vary ballot size from 3 to 12, using Cunow’s
(2014) MPH software. We test for differences in expressed support as a function of candi-
date gender. We find a strong and remarkably consistent 7 percentage point bias in favor of
women candidates. This pro-woman bias is remarkably consistent across subjects’ gender,
education, political interest, and issue preferences. There is a slight difference in effect size
across party: the pro-female bias was strongest for subjects supporting leftist parties, but
even so, there is pro-female bias for subjects supporting other parties, as well as among
independent subjects.
Our experimental results have several possible interpretations. One is a demonstration
1The quota law is quite lax. If there are more than 70% of candidates of the same sex on a party list,
candidates of the over-represented gender can be removed from the list but they are not substituted by
candidates of the under-represented gender. Furthermore, this policy only applies if parties submit the
maximum number of candidates possible per constituency. This maximum was raised from 100% to 150% of
total seats per constituency at the time the quota law passed, thus minimizing the effect of the quota law.
Finally, because of Brazil’s open list system, the law does not include restrictions for the position of female
candidates on party lists.
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effect associated with the election of the then very popular Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s first
woman president, where positive affect for the President might benefit all female candidates.
We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to test for demonstration effects in mayoral
elections, asking whether the election of a female mayor has positive effects for women
running for other offices in subsequent elections. Results in this case are negative; the
election of a woman mayor reduces expected vote share for women in some downstream
elections; in others, the demonstration effect has no obvious effect.
We proceed in four additional steps. In section two, we discuss the literature on gender
stereotypes affecting vote choice. The third section describes our experimental design. The
fourth section presents the results from the experiments as well as the regression discontinu-
ity. The final section discusses our findings and suggests directions for future research.
2 Factors Affecting Support for Female Politicians
As mentioned, most previous work on Latin America focuses on quotas’ and other rules’
impact on descriptive representation - the number of women elected under various institu-
tional frameworks. Research on voters’ attitudes about gender, however, is less common in
Latin America. The majority of the studies looking at women’s political participation in
electoral politics examine established democracies, usually the United States, Canada, and
Western Europe. Previous work on voters, primarily survey research, examines the impact of
individual traits, broader context, and stereotypes in shaping voter attitudes toward female
politicians.
Scholars have found many individual traits that affect attitudes toward female candi-
dates, including gender of subject, political interest, age, education, and ideology (Dolan,
1997; Sanbonmatsu, 2002). At the same time, these do not appear to have universal traction
cross-nationally. Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki and Crisp (2010) looked at three cases with single
transferable vote and found that voters preferred female candidates in Australia, male can-
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didates in Ireland, and were indifferent across candidate gender in Malta, with some factors
flipping signs or losing significance across cases. This suggests that gender attitudes are
highly context and culture specific.
Beyond individual factors, scholars also argue that context matters. Much of this litera-
ture focuses on the role of development. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that moderniza-
tion leads citizens to hold more egalitarian views regarding gender. On the other hand, there
are notable deviant cases where gaps in women’s political representation persist in developed
countries, like the United States and Japan.
In addition to modernization, scholars have also examined the impact of other contextual
factors on gender attitudes, including socialization, status discontent, and elite cues. Morgan
and Buice (2013) examine both contextual and individual factors that affect attitudes toward
women, as well as their interaction. Status discontent suggests that men will be threatened
by increasing female representation, but only above a certain threshold. Elite cues also have
differential effects because they should only affect those with weaker opinions. Morgan and
Buice (2013) find no evidence of any socialization interactions, but they do find evidence of
status discontent and elite cue impacts on gender attitudes.
Citizens’ attitudes toward female politicians can also be mediated by stereotypes and
group consciousness. The majority of studies looking at the effect of stereotypes and group
consciousness on voters’ attitudes toward female candidates are based in the U.S. and find
a negative effect of gender stereotypes, affecting mostly male voters, on female candidates’
electoral success. For example, people perceive women as soft, caring, nurturing, and com-
passionate, while they perceive men as good leaders, strong, and decisive, thereby making
men more appealing for decision-making positions (Alexander and Andersen, 1993; Burrell,
1995; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Kahn and Fridkin, 1996; Koch, 1999; Lawless, 2004).
Thus, voters often consider men to be better suited for the demands of political office. In
addition, when voters face female candidates, their electoral decisions are mediated by stereo-
types related to women’s competence in dealing with typically male issues. Those voters who
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think that women can deal with “male issues” tend to be more supportive of female can-
didates (Dolan, 2010; Lammers, Gordijn and Otten, 2009). Some studies have also shown
the importance of voters’ perceptions of the most important problem facing their country
when deciding between a female and a male candidate. In situations where voters think that
social issues (e.g. health care) are the most relevant, they tend to favor women over men;
but when voters think the main problem is more competitive in nature (e.g. war, economy,
etc.) they tend to favor men over women (Lammers, Gordijn and Otten, 2009).
Brazil provides a difficult and contradictory case for this literature. On the one hand,
Brazil appears to be a progressive case where female politicians can compete. The current
President is a woman, and in surveys, Brazilians report that they see female politicians
as more honest, responsible, and capable than men (Htun, 2002). On the other hand, in
the legislature, even with quota laws, women hold less than 10% of the seats (IPU, 2014).
Scholars described Brazilian politics as “dominated by masculine personality cult” in which
there have not been many women in positions of power (Htun, 2002, 472) and where women
lose to men in within-party competition (Htun and Jones, 2002).
We seek to contribute in two ways. First, we use experimental and regression disconti-
nuity analysis to eliminate confounding and provide better measures of the impact of gender
on voter support for candidates. Previous work on Brazil is largely observational - exam-
ining aggregate electoral returns or survey data. But while such data can be instructive,
there are two major challenges to measuring the independent effect of candidate gender on
vote choice. One is that no two candidates are alike, differing in policy positions, campaign
strategies, charisma, experience, and anything else that matters, and it would be impossible
to anticipate and account for every factor that matters. The other is that candidates may
emerge strategically - one might expect female candidates to emerge in the most promising
contexts for female candidates. Both mean that we are unlikely to accurately measure the
impact of candidate gender on vote choice using observational data.
Second, we propose and test an explanation for the difference in women’s success at the
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legislative and presidential levels. In an earlier study on race, we found that voters’ attitudes
interact with institutions in shaping their candidate selection. When voters were choosing
between just three leading candidates, they were more likely to choose the candidate that
best matched their preferences. But when choice sets were large - say 12 or more candidates
- voters were overwhelmed by the task of sorting and choosing, and instead fell back on
latent racial biases - with white subjects choosing white candidates, and nonwhite subjects
choosing nonwhite candidates (Aguilar et al., Forthcoming). The explanation is that voters
have latent racial biases that are only visible when they have difficulty making decisions.
We imagine a similar mechanism at work in Brazil. In most recent Presidential campaigns
there have been just two competitive candidates. Thus, when voting for President, voters
should evaluate candidates carefully and without any latent bias. In contrast, Brazil uses a
highly permissive electoral system for legislative elections, resulting in hundreds of candidates
in each district2. In this environment, where voters are overwhelmed with large choice sets,
careful policy analysis of all candidates is impossible. Instead, voters should use other
heuristics, including gender, to choose candidates. We expect these heuristics to favor male
over female candidates. This leads us to our two core hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 We expect a negative gender gap in candidate preference; all else equal, male
candidates will have more expressed support than female candidates.
In addition, we test for the impact of subjects’ characteristics on these attitudes. We examine
the impact of subject gender, education, political interest, policy priorities, and ideology, as
well as interactions between subject gender and these factors.
The second core hypothesis addresses the puzzle of differential performance across levels
- why women are winning the presidency, but losing in legislative elections:
Hypothesis 2 The size of the gender gap will vary with ballot length; it will be small when
voters choose between only a few candidates, but will grow as choice sets become large and
2City council, state assembly, and national lower house elections all use open-list proportional representa-
tion. For the national and state elections, states act as electoral districts. In most states there are hundreds
of candidates, and almost 1,000 compete in the largest states. See Cunow (2014) for more details.
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complicated. When choosing between many candidates - as in a proportional representation
ballot - voters’ will rely less on a careful analysis of policy positions and will instead fall back
on latent gender biases, reducing vote shares for women.
In the next section, we describe our experiments, then turn to results.
3 Experimental Design
We used two survey experiments to test for gender bias in attitudes. We conducted the
first in Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil from June to August, 2011. A total of approximately 600 adults
participated. Survey respondents were presented with profiles of hypothetical candidates,
were told that these might run for federal deputy in the next elections, and were asked
who they would vote for or if they would prefer to abstain. Candidate profiles included
candidates’ names, photos, brief biographies, and policy positions on three issues. Subjects
were also asked a set of questions about their own income, education, political interest,
party affiliation, and race. Subjects were sampled in a diverse set of neighborhoods across
Sa˜o Paulo and surveys were conducted in person in public places including sidewalks, parks,
and plazas.
The key treatment was the random assignment of candidate gender and race. Respon-
dents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. In each condition,
respondents were presented with profiles of three hypothetical candidates. Across all condi-
tions, the profiles of two of the candidates (Se´rgio and Leonardo) remained constant while
the profile of the third candidate (Fernando), henceforth referred to as “the treatment can-
didate”, was varied to show a white male, white female, black male, or a black female.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 shows the four sets of candidate profiles used in the experiment.3 Across treat-
3We also varied ballot order such that the treatment candidate was not always in the middle position on
the ballot
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ment conditions, the only differences in the candidate profiles are the photo of the treatment
candidate and some information in the profile that was changed to reflect the candidate’s
gender such as the candidate’s name (Fernando became Fernanda) and the gender of the
candidate’s spouse, as well as some grammatical changes (e.g. changing “him” to “her” and
using the female version of adjectives).
We estimate the effect of candidate race and gender by comparing the vote share of the
treatment candidate across experimental conditions. Given that respondents were randomly
assigned to the four experimental conditions and assuming that (as we illustrate below) our
randomization was successful, the subject profiles in each of the four experimental condi-
tions were equivalent. The only differences across conditions were the race and gender of
Fernando/Fernanda. We would expect then, that if the race and gender of candidates does
not influence vote choice, support for Fernando/Fernanda candidates would have been equal
in all four experimental conditions. Similarly, any differences in the percentage of subjects
preferring the treatment candidate across conditions can be attributed to a preference among
subjects in the experiment for candidates of a particular race and gender as there is no other
variation that could explain those differences.
Given our limited sample size, we followed up the first study with a second survey ex-
periment conducted between June and August, 2013. In this experiment we surveyed a
nationwide sample of 4,000 Brazilian voters who were recruited from a large panel main-
tained by a private market research firm. Respondents were informed that they would be
participating in an academic study about political attitudes and were compensated with
points that could be redeemed to purchase items from the survey firm’s online marketplace.
The procedure in this experiment is similar to the first: respondents answer some questions
about themselves, view a ballot with candidate profiles, and choose a preferred candidate. A
key difference with the first experiment however, is the use of a new online survey platform,
MPH, to implement the survey (Cunow, 2014).
The MPH platform has a number of features that are useful for researchers conducting
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survey experiments. Most importantly for our purposes, it fully randomizes the candidate
profile generation process. The process works as follows. For each respondent, MPH con-
structs a new ballot from a pool of researcher-generated candidate attributes. We supplied
the software with 36 candidate names, biographies, photographs, and policy positions. After
randomly assigning respondents to view a 3, 6, or 12 candidate ballot, MPH creates a new
ballot for each respondent. The ballot is generated by randomly drawing without replace-
ment from the pool of candidate attributes and assigning to each ballot position a name,
biography, photograph, and set of policy positions. This process is repeated until the ballot
is complete. Figure 2 presents sample 3, 6, and 12 candidate ballots.
Regardless of the number of candidates on the ballot, the proportions of white male, black
male and white female candidates are maintained constant at 1/3. The candidate attributes
we supplied had equivalent male and female versions which only varied in their names (e.g.
Marcelo and Marcela), the gender of their spouses, and the grammar used in the profiles. As
a result, for each male candidate there was an equivalent female. As in our first experiment
we estimate the effect of candidate gender on vote choice by comparing the aggregate vote
shares of the female and male candidates in the experiment. Unlike our first experiment
however, there is no control group. Rather, because all of the candidate attributes are
orthogonal to one another, in the aggregate all of the male and female candidates in the
experiment should otherwise be equivalent and any differences in their vote shares can be
attributed to their race and gender. This approach is similar to conjoint analysis, a technique
often used in marketing but also recently applied in work in political science (Hainmueller,
Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014; Cunow, 2014).
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Fully randomizing the generation of the candidate profiles has a number of important
advantages over the “static” approach we employed in our first experiment with in-person
interviews. By drawing from a larger pool of candidate attributes, we can more confidently
attribute any treatment effects to candidate gender rather than to the names or photographs
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used in the experiment. In other words, since we sample from 12 photos, names and biogra-
phies of female candidates, it is less likely that any observed gender effects will will be driven
by the particular photos, names, or biographies being used (e.g. if the photo of the female
candidate used in the experiment is somehow more trustworthy than that of her male equiv-
alent for the control group). Similarly, we also avoid potentially undetectable interaction
effects whereby gender effects might only appear when certain other candidate attributes
are present (e.g. if voters only prefer female candidate over male candidates when the can-
didates’ backgrounds include degrees in economics). For a more detailed discussion of the
MPH platform and its benefits see Cunow (2014).4
4 Results
Our initial experiment offered subjects a choice between three candidates. Two candidates’
pictures and profiles never varied and the third candidate was the treatment candidate. For
the treatment candidate, the policy position and profile never varied, but the picture varied
between male and female candidates and names and pronouns were changed to correspond
accordingly (Fernando or Fernanda; “his” or “hers”).
The appropriate comparison is thus the percentage of subjects voting for the treatment
candidate when that candidate was a woman (“Fernanda”) versus the percentage voting for
the treatment candidate when assigned gender was male (“Fernando”). Table 1 shows the
percentage of subjects in each treatment that chose “Fernando/a”, the treatment candidate.
For both white and black candidates, there is a positive gender gap, with a higher proportion
of subjects preferring a female Fernanda over a male equivalent. Overall, 26% of subjects
chose a female Fernanda, while 20% chose a male “Fernando” (p-value for difference .07).
When partitioned by candidate race, there is additional variance. The effect is larger, and
significant for the white candidates: a 10% difference, versus a small and insignificant result
for subjects that saw a black Fernando or Fernanda. Subjects also did not particularly like
4Paper available at: http://acsweb.ucsd.edu/~scunow/
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any of our Fernando/Fernanda’s, as the percentage choosing that candidate was consistently
less than 33%.5
As one follow-up, we examined subjects’ perceptions of the treatment candidate, that is,
the candidate whose gender was varied, as a function of candidate gender. At the end of
the treatment, we asked subjects about their perceptions of candidate traits, including com-
petence and honesty. We tested whether subject perceptions of the hypothetical candidate
varied with candidate gender (not shown). Differences in perceptions of candidate quality
did not vary significantly with candidate gender.
In the second experiment, we focused on the impact of ballot structure on choice psy-
chology. Tables 2 through 6 report cross tabs of vote choice and related treatments. In
each of these tables, the cell figures are the proportion of subjects that voted for a female
candidate. In every experimental treatment, exactly one-third of candidates were women
(1 of 3, 2 of 6, or 4 of 12). Thus, if gender had no impact on Brazilian voters’ attitudes,
we should consistently see .33 of subjects choosing a female candidate. Bias against women
politicians would be indicated by values below .33; bias in favor of women by figures above
.33.
Table 2 addresses our core hypothesis regarding gender and choice set size. For both
men and women, there is a consistent pro-female bias in candidate choice. Overall, 40% of
subjects chose a female candidate across all treatments; this figure is significantly greater
than the baseline 33% of gender-blind voting. For men, there is no evidence of any sensitivity
to choice set size; the pro-female bias is quite stable across all ballot treatments. Support for
female candidates by men is 37% for 3-candidate ballots, 40% for 6 candidate ballots, and
41% for 12 candidate ballots. There are are no significant differences across ballot lengths
for men, suggesting no latent preferences that are revealed only in larger choice sets.
For women, the pattern is similar, with suggestive, but not significant differences across
5This may have been because our candidate was a centrist relative to the other competing candidates,
or because one of the other candidates was more attractive for some other reason. We did control for ballot
order by randomly varying ballot position by many different ballot orderings and randomly assigning the
ordering to each subject.
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ballot length. For both 3 and 6-candidate ballots, women subjects have a steady pro-female
bias in behavior, similar to that of male subjects. Their support for women candidates
falls to 38% for the twelve candidate ballot. Given the relatively small sample size for that
treatment, however, the results are not significant and the trend could easily be explained
by sampling variance. Thus we find that both women and men express a stable pro-female
bias that does not vary with ballot length.
We also examined whether there were any patterns in support across other standard
covariates. The short answer is that the pro-female bias is remarkably stable across all
controls, and remains stable in our multivariate analysis (below).
Table 3 shows support for female candidates by gender and education level. Given pre-
vious work on gender in Latin America, with findings that voters in lower education cohorts
maintain traditional gender role support, we expected such a trend to emerge in our ex-
periment. The table shows, however, that the experiment does not provide evidence of an
education - gender voting relationship. As observed previously, the patterns across educa-
tion levels and across subject gender are remarkably stable, with female candidate voting
consistently near 40%. An important shortcoming for this study, however, is the severe
under-representation of low-education subjects, with only about 200 subjects having less
than a high school education.
Table 4 compares the magnitude of the gender gap as a function of self-reported political
interest. Again, we find no difference in the gender gap across levels of political interest.
There is again a consistent 7 percentage point positive gender gap across all levels of political
interest, with very little variance.
Previous work has also found that female candidates do best when focusing on “women’s
issues”, as women candidates enjoy or suffer a form of issue ownership and credibility in
these areas, including family issues, and many social welfare issues. Table 5 shows voting by
subject and candidate issues. The first part of the table shows female candidate support by
subjects’ top-ranked issue. Note that while subjects could choose between 12 issues, more
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than half identified corruption as the top issue, and 83% of respondents chose either corrup-
tion, education, or healthcare. The observed differences in voting for women candidates are
consistent with previous work on gender. Subjects whose top issues are traditionally male
dominated have weaker preferences for women candidates. For those most concerned with
crime, the economy, or corruption, 39% chose women candidates. Similarly, subjects whose
top issues were those traditionally dominated by women - education and healthcare - have
slightly stronger preferences for female candidates: 43% and 42%, respectively.
While this variation across issues appears to explain part of the pro-woman bias in
behavior, for every issue category, there is a positive gender gap, as the preference for women
candidates is always above the null rate of .33. For most issues these positive gender gaps are
significant. They are not significant for crime or the economy, but fewer than 200 subjects
ranked those issues first. Furthermore, while the trends are suggestive and consistent with
the literature, the cross-issue differences are not statistically significant.
Table 6 shows female candidate support by age cohort and by gender. Again, all age
cohorts show a roughly 7 percentage point pro-female candidate bias, consistently favoring
women candidates more frequently than expected under gender-blind voting. For women,
support for female candidates is quite steady across all age groups. For men, the pro-female
trend increases gradually with age, but again, the trend is not statistically significant. These
results contrast with previous research on the United States, which found that older men
were less likely to support a female candidate than younger men and than older women
(Flannelly, 2002).
The stability and strength of the pro-woman bias is surprising. One potential confounding
variable is partisanship. Perhaps, one might suggest, gender is a cue for ideology or policy
positions.6 In many countries, women politicians tend to be members of left-of-center parties,
or to take left-of-center policy positions. Of course there are many exceptions, but gender
might signal to subjects the ideological tendency of the candidate. This tendency should
6Thanks to Randy Stevenson for this suggestion.
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be exacerbated by our research design, in which candidates’ party identification was not
provided.
An implication is that subjects affiliated with leftist parties might be using gender as a
cue, and thus selecting women at higher rates than nonpartisans and center/right subjects.
In other words, perhaps there is no gender bias, instead, gender is an informational shortcut
for ideology. We test this possibility in Table 7. Note first that few of our subjects expressed
a partisan preference. 81% simply responded that they had no party preference or parti-
sanship. Just 18% expressed any partisanship, a total of 698 subjects. These “partisans”
expressed preferences for 27 distinct political parties. Most parties were preferred by fewer
than 10 subjects. Just three had more than 50: the ruling Worker’s Party, or PT; the pre-
vious ruling party, the PSDB; and the Green Party, or PV. Note that 1% of respondents
responded affirmatively to the question of partisanship, but failed to identify which party
they preferred. Some of these identified more than one party or a class of parties (“The PT
and the PCdoB”, or “All authentic leftist parties”). Other respondents in this category iden-
tified an individual politician instead of a party (“Dilma” (the current president), “Maluf”,
or “Eduardo Suplicy”, for example).
The table shows that there is increased gender voting among affiliates of the leftist Work-
ers’ Party (PT), the Green Party (PV), and the combination of all other small parties. Fully
half of Green Party members selected a female candidate, significantly more than the base-
line one-third of the null hypothesis. For the Worker’s Party (PT), 44% selected a female
candidate, also significantly different from the baseline .33. Subjects in the “Other” category
also chose the female canddiates at higher rates. In contrast, in the largest non-leftist party,
the PSDB, the gender gap in candidate choice was lower (37%), but still greater than the
baseline .33 (though not significantly so).
The results are suggestive of a difference between leftist and non-leftist parties, but those
differences are not significant. And again, the consistent pro-female bias in candidate choice
emerges for every category. These results might, of course, be different with a larger sample,
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and the analysis is made difficult by relatively low rates of partisanship among our subjects in
particular, and Brazilians in general. However, the conclusion from this analysis is that while
partisanship may affect pro-women voting, and leftist parties appear to have higher positive
gender gaps, these results are merely suggestive. Even after controlling for partisanship,
there are still significant pro-women biases in candidate choice.
We now assess the impact of these variables jointly in a multivariate model. In this case,
we consider the causal effect of candidate gender when controlling for multiple covariates
in a multivariate model. Recall that each voter faces a multinomial choice problem; each
sees a set of 3, 6, or 12 candidates, and must choose one. There are potentially relevant
characteristics of both voters and candidates that we would expect to be considered.
Because each subject is choosing between several alternatives, and because the key treat-
ments vary across the alternatives, we estimate a conditional logit model to determine the
effect of gender on candidate choice while controlling for other variables.
Table 8 shows the results of our mixed logit models. The critical covariates and their
estimates are shown in the first several rows of the table. In Model 1, Woman Candidate,
is interacted with ballot length; in Models 2 and 3, Woman Candidate enters the models
without interactions. In all models, with controls, there is a steady and consistent pro-female
bias in candidate choice. For Model 1, there is no evidence of a ballot length-candidate choice
interaction; the coefficients are not significantly different from each other (test not shown).
In Model 2, Woman candidate also enters as a main effect and as an interaction with Subject
Gender (Woman = 1). Those results again show a strong pro-female bias in candidate choice,
but no difference between men and women, as the interaction between Woman Candidate
and Woman Subject is not significant. Our dummy variable for subject partisanship, as in
the simple bivariate analysis, does not add explanatory power. Model 3 adds interactions
between Woman Candidate and key issue areas; again with no significant interactions.7
Covariates reveal other patterns affecting vote choice. Ballot position does affect results;
7We conducted a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the policy and partisanship interactions
with gender and failed to reject the null of no significant impact on the model.
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subjects are more likely to choose candidates near the top of the ballot than those further
down. Candidates’ proximity to voters, as measured by their policy rank, is also signifi-
cant. Candidates whose positions are more consistent with those of voters are significantly
more likely to be chosen. This result is reassuring both for our understandings of Brazilian
democracy, as well as for our assessments of how seriously subjects took the exercise of the
experiment. Finally, there is also a pro-black bias in candidate support. Nonwhite candi-
dates receive significantly higher support than white candidates. Our interaction between
nonwhite candidate and nonwhite subject shows that the pro-black bias is much stronger for
nonwhite subjects. These results are consistent with our earlier work on race and voting in
Brazil (Aguilar et al., Forthcoming).
The “Demonstration Effect” of Women in Office
How can we explain the strong preference for female candidates we observe in our exper-
iments? One possibility is that voters preferred the female candidates in the experiments
because of recent positive experiences with a female president. In 2010, Brazilians elected
the first female president in the country’s history, Dilma Rousseff. We conducted our first
experiment approximately six months after Dilma’s inauguration and near the height of her
popularity.8 It is possible that having an ongoing positive experience with a woman elected
to the most visible and powerful office in the country led many Brazilian voters to prefer
female candidates for other offices, including those in our survey. This is what we refer to as
the “demonstration effect” – a recent or ongoing experience with a member of a previously
underrepresented group may demonstrate to voters the suitability of members of that group
for leadership and lead voters to prefer such candidate types in subsequent elections.
We test this hypothesis by analyzing whether the election of a female mayor and the
experience of a woman running local government in a municipality increases voteshare for
8Our second experiment was conducted during a wave of mass protests in 2013 when Dilma’s approval
ratings were considerably lower. She has since been reelected.
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female candidates in subsequent elections.9 We employ a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) to test for a demonstration effect of female mayors elected in 2008 on the municipal
vote share of female candidates in the subsequent 2010 national elections in Brazil. We
hypothesize that the experience of living in a municipality where the local government is
run by a female mayor will increase the vote share of female candidates in the subsequent
election.
Table 9 shows the results of our analysis. We test for an effect of a female mayor winning
a close election on the municipal vote share of all the female candidates for each office on
the ballot in 2010. For each of these offices we run two models: one with a bandwidth of
one percent and one with the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2009).10 We find mixed evidence of a demonstration effect of female mayors on the vote share
of female candidates in the 2010 election. Of the five offices on the ballot in 2010, only the
vote shares of female candidates for state deputy are consistently and significantly impacted
by the election of a female mayor in 2008.11 Perhaps most surprisingly, this effect is in the
opposite of the anticipated direction – in municipalities that elected a female mayor in 2008,
voters were less likely to vote for female candidates for state deputy than in municipalities
which elected a male mayor. Thus, although we find evidence of a demonstration effect on
this part of the 2010 ballot, it is a negative demonstration effect.
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
The vote share of female gubernatorial candidates are the only other part of the 2010
ballot significantly impacted by a female mayor winning office in 2008. However, this signif-
icant effect appears only at the optimal bandwidth (9.36%) which substantively we believe
9Others have found diffusion effects from the election of women; the election of a woman in one munici-
pality increases the probability that a woman will run in a neighboring municipality (Gilardi, 2013). We do
not have the space to fully explore this hypothesis in this paper.
10For each office we ran RDD models with all bandwidths from 1-10% in 1% increments. Results for state
deputy were consistent across all bandwidths. Here we include the only the 1% bandwidth.
11We exclude from our analysis municipalities in which the mayor did not complete his or her term because
he/she was subsequently “cassado” - removed from office for unlawful activity.
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is too wide to credibly indicate assignment “as if random”. For all other elections on the
ballot we find no significant demonstration effect on female vote share.
There are obvious shortcomings with this test. The lack of a demonstration effect at
the mayoral level may not be generalizable to the Presidential level. Mayors are important
political actors, but their profile and prestige obviously do not match that of national lead-
ership. In addition, we have not controlled for mayoral performance. President Rousseff’s
popularity might have reflected a combination of gender and (at the time) a strong economy.
The combination of the two might lead voters to prefer women for other offices, hoping for
similar high-performance outcomes. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable performance
data at the municipal level. We can conclude, however, that in our sampled municipalities,
that the experience of having a woman mayor had no significant impact on subsequent vote
shares for women.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have examined the gender gap in candidate support in Brazil, with surprising
results. In a survey experiment, we found evidence that both female and male voters were
favorably disposed toward female candidates in Sa˜o Paulo, with about a 7% percentage point
increase in support for a hypothetical candidate when that person was female instead of male.
Looking at the gender bias by the race of the candidate, we found that there was no gender
bias for black candidates but the bias remained among the white candidates. The core result
does pose a challenge: if there is a pro-female bias, why are women underrepresented in the
National Congress?
In a second round of experiments, using new software, we sought to answer this question,
testing for an interaction between ballot length and gender bias. Yet when randomizing
candidate gender, across different issues, ballot sizes, and backgrounds, we still found a
consistent positive bias for female candidates. The size of the effect in our study was close to
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7 percentage points regardless of ballot length. The simple treatment effect was consistently
significant with diverse controls, and there was little evidence that the impact of gender
varied across any of the usual suspects: subjects’ gender, education, political interest, age,
and others.
The only variables that appeared to modestly affect the gender gap were partisanship
and issue priorities. Subjects expressing support for leftist parties having a larger gender gap
than those with other partisan preferences. Notably, however, there was still a pro-woman
bias among subjects for all parties. There is modest evidence of a relationship between
the subjects’ policy priorities and gender preference - but even stronger again was the pro-
female bias which persists across all policy priorities. Further, neither partisanship nor issue
priorities had statistically significant effects on the size of the gender bias.
Our results naturally prompted some search for explanation. At the time of the study,
Brazil’s first female President, Dilma Rousseff, was enjoying remarkable popularity and
public support. We hypothesized that our observed positive gender bias might be the result of
a demonstration effect - the projection of the support for Dilma onto other female politicians.
To test this hypothesis, we exploited mayoral elections in an RDD to measure the impact
of a woman winning a mayoral contest on the votes shares of other women in subsequent
elections. For some subsequent elections we found no relationship and in other cases we
found that the election of a woman actually reduced women’s vote shares. This result might
signal that for dissatisfied voters who have experience with female mayors, female politicians
are no longer outsiders and so voters cannot express their frustration with the system by
voting for a woman.
Our findings are remarkable and unexpected. Women have increased their political par-
ticipation and power significantly over the last decades, but still face many challenges in
Brazil. We expected a negative gender gap which would increase with ballot length, as vot-
ers would rely more on negative stereotypes towards female politicans. Instead, we found a
remarkably strong and stable positive gender gap in all our experimental treatments.
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We see these results as a call to expand research on voters’ attitudes about gender and
leadership. In particular, we see pressing challenges to refine and extend our findings, as
well as a proximate agenda to link our experimental results with the reality of women’s
underrepresentation in many areas of Brazilian politics.
Regarding the first, we are convinced of the strength and robustness of our results, but
there are several potential design improvements and changes to refine and extend these
results. One would be dropping the inclusion of candidate photos in the experiment, to see
if some measure of pleasantness or attractiveness explains the gender gap we observed. We
believe this an unlikely explanation for our results, because we varied the pictures of all the
candidates, and randomly drew female and male images from a larger sample of pictures of
women and men. Furthermore, we tested for picture-effects, and found no evidence, after
controlling for gender and race, that candidate pictures affected vote choice.12
In addition, our design should be extended beyond urban Sa˜o Paulo and internet pools
to a representative sample of all Brazilians, with adequate representation of the poor and
rural voters. Presumably, these cohorts would be most likely to hold traditional attitudes
and might yield very different results than did our samples. At the same time, we do not
expect this to change our overarching finding. The great majority of Brazilians today live
in urban areas, and the rural voters are a smaller and smaller group. Further, our samples
included a small number of low income subjects, and for these subjects, we observed the
same pro-female bias in candidate choice.
A reviewer and several other readers have pointed out another possible explanation for
the pro-female bias that we cannot test here: it may be that the consistent minority status
of the female candidates in our experiment are driving the result - women were a minority
of all treatments where they appeared, always 1/3 of candidates. We might see different
12Specifically, we tested whether a model which included dummy variables for each candidate image fit
the data significantly better than a model which only had dummy variables for race and gender. We failed
to reject the null at the .05 level. This result has limitations; it tests whether there are significant differences
between same race and same gender images in the study, but cannot test whether all the women candidates’
images were more pleasant than, say, all the men’s images.
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results were they a majority of the candidates. However, empirically, women are a minority
of candidates in Brazil - so our experiment mirrors the gender distribution voters actually
face.
Lastly, our design requires additional research into the intersection of race and gender.
In our pilot study, we varied the race of our female candidates; in the follow-up we did not
have the resources to do so. The pilot study suggested neither positive nor negative bias for
black female candidates. The study was limited, and the finding potentially very important,
and deserves replication and extension.
With respect to methodology, the fully randomized design employed by the MPH survey
platform in our second experiment can be applied in future work exploring the relationship
between candidate characteristics and vote choice. By allowing race, gender, and other
candidate qualities to vary independently from one another, we can more accurately identify
the effects of those attributes on vote choice as well as any interactions between candidate
attributes and institutions.
The preceding suggest experimental work to better understand the nature of voters’
attitudes. At the same, time, given our robust pro-woman finding, a new puzzle deserves
attention: given voters’ apparent strong preference for female candidates, why are there not
more women holding office in Brazil? Indeed, there should be more women than men in office,
given our results, yet women are just 10% of Brazil’s National Congress. Our experimental
results suggest that this is not a problem associated with voter attitudes, ballot size, or
choice set psychology.
A promising area of investigation should be in the institutions that shape candidate re-
cruitment and resources. This implies studies of the types of candidates entering politics, and
some research on why many accomplished women do not enter politics in Brazil. Further,
for those who do run, are their bids as successful as men’s, or less successful? Future inves-
tigations might ask whether there is bias in the allocation of campaign resources, perhaps
on the part of parties through media time and prominence or through donors.
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Returning to our core findings of a pro-woman bias, we believe that, given women’s
historical underrepresentation in Brazilian political leadership, they may represent a class
of outsiders to those unsatisfied with the political system or the goods it delivers. The
protests of 2013, which continue at time of this writing, reveal a great deal of frustration
with many aspects of the Brazilian political system. Nearly every politician talks of change,
reform, integrity, and progress - but many Brazilians are unsatisfied with their performance.
Women may represent outsiders, an alternative to a failing status quo and perhaps a new
future.
If our hypothesis proves correct, this puts additional pressure on the Rousseff adminis-
tration to meet expectations. Elected with substantial support as the successor to a very
popular president, her administration has been challenged by slowing growth in emerging
markets, continuing corruption scandals, and challenges in the approaching Olympic games.
Should the Rousseff administration fail to deliver, this may be a negative example that will
reduce support for women across Brazil. As Htun (2002) observes, expectations for elected
women tend to be higher than those for elected men. Whether the result will be a negative
gender bias remains to be seen.
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Table 1: Candidate Choice by Candidate Gender and Race in First Experiment
Candidate Race:
Combined White Black
Candidate Race p n p n p n
Female 0.257 296 0.284 148 0.230 148
Male 0.196 312 0.181 160 0.211 152
Difference 0.061 0.103 0.019
P-value 0.071 0.033 0.688
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Table 2: Candidate Choice by Ballot Length and Subject Gender
3 Candidates 6 Cand. 12 Cand. Total
p n p n p n
Women 0.42 712 * 0.42 690 * 0.38 708 * 0.41 2110 *
Men 0.37 566 0.40 561 * 0.41 610 * 0.39 1737 *
Diff. 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Combined 0.40 1278 * 0.41 1251 * 0.39 1318 * 0.40 3847 *
Cells report the proportion of each cohort choosing one of the women candidates, with a
baseline proportion of .33 under random voting. Asterisks denote significance at the .05
level for deviations from baseline .33 voting, or for differences between men and women
subjects, as labeled.
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Table 3: Vote Choice by Gender and Education
x < HS HS College x > College
p n p n p n
Women 0.42 93 0.40 675 * 0.42 672 * 0.41 670 *
Men 0.43 105 * 0.40 529 * 0.38 538 * 0.39 565 *
Difference -0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.01
Combined 0.42 198 * 0.40 1204 * 0.40 1210 * 0.40 1235 *
Cells report the proportion of each cohort choosing one of the women candidates, with a
baseline proportion of .33 under random voting. Asterisks denote significance at the .05
level for deviations from baseline .33 voting, or for differences between men and women
subjects, as labeled.
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Table 4: Vote Choice by Political Interest
Interest p n
Not Interested 0.40 * 482
Little Interested 0.42 * 1254
Interested 0.40 * 1468
Very Interested 0.39 * 645
Cells report the proportion of each cohort choosing one of the women candidates, with a
baseline proportion of .33 under random voting.
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Table 5: Vote Choice by Subjects’ Top Issues
p n
Corruption 0.39 * 2031
Crime 0.39 145
Economy 0.39 144
Education 0.43 * 669
Healthcare 0.42 * 546
Other 0.40 * 314
Cells report the proportion of each cohort choosing one of the women candidates, with a
baseline proportion of .33 under random voting.
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Table 6: Vote Choice by Age and Gender
18-30 31-45 46-59 60+
Age p n p n p n p n
Women 0.41 1029 * 0.42 739 * 0.38 286 0.42 53
Men 0.37 577 0.38 643 * 0.43 397 * 0.42 117
Difference 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.00
Combined 0.40 1606 * 0.40 1382 * 0.41 683 * 0.42 170 *
Cells report the proportion of each cohort choosing one of the women candidates, with a
baseline proportion of .33 under random voting.
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Table 7: Vote Choice by Subjects’ Self-Identified Partisanship
p n
None 0.40 * 3103
Other 0.42 * 255
PSDB 0.37 164
PT 0.44 * 251
PV 0.50 * 76
Cells report the proportion of each cohort choosing one of the women candidates, with a
baseline proportion of .33 under random voting.
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Table 8: Conditional Logit Models of Vote Choice
Candidate Choice Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Woman Candidate 0.407∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.056) (0.080)
Woman Cand * Ballot Length 0.007
(0.009)
Nonwhite Candidate 0.234∗∗∗ 0.115∗ 0.114∗
(0.043) (0.053) (0.053)
Woman Cand & Subject 0.092 0.092
(0.068) (0.069)
Nonwhite Cand & Subject 0.301∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.072)
Ballot Position −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Candidate Proximity to Voter −0.079∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Woman Cand * Health −0.041
(0.109)
Woman Cand * Family −0.242
(0.173)
Woman Cand * Corruption −0.134
(0.078)
Woman Cand * Party 0.111
(0.082)
N 25758 25746 25746
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 1: Candidate Profiles with “Treatment Candidate” of Varying Race and Gender (First
Experiment)
Sérgio Augusto Ribeiro
Sérgio é advogado graduado pela Universidade de São Paulo. Após concluir a 
universidade, trabalhou em um escritório de advocacia, antes de decidir dedicar a sua 
vida à política. Desde então, trabalhou no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São 
Paulo, onde serviu como uma ligação entre os legisladores estaduais e os juízes. 
Sérgio também tem trabalhado como agente do Ministério Federal da Justiça. Ele é 
casado com Juliana e tem dois filhos: Thiago, 12 anos, e Renata, 9 anos.
Impostos:
Sérgio vai aumentar os impostos sobre os ricos, a fim de aumentar os gastos 
governamentais em serviços sociais voltados para os pobres
Saúde:
Para assegurar que as pessoas tenham acesso à saúde pública de qualidade, Sérgio 
vai construir novos hospitais e centros de saúde e contratar mais médicos.
Meio Ambiente:
Sérgio pretende proteger a Amazônia, e, ao mesmo tempo, desenvolver um 
programa sustentável para permitir que os pequenos agricultores se beneficiem de 
uma parte da floresta tropical.
Fernando Lopes Damazio
Fernando se formou em economia pela Universidade de Campinas. Desde que 
decidiu seguir uma vida na política, ele trabalha como assessor na Assembléia 
Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo, ajudando a planejar o orçamento do estado. Ele 
também trabalhou para o Ministério da Fazenda como consultor fiscal. Fernando deu 
aulas na Universidade de Brasília. Ele e sua esposa, Viviane têm dois filhos: João, 10 
anos, e Gabriel, 6 anos.
Impostos:
A fim de aumentar os gastos públicos, Fernando pretende aumentar os impostos 
igualmente para todos os cidadãos.
Saúde:
Fernando criará programas de treinamento para médicos e enfermeiros para 
melhorar a qualidade do atendimento.
Meio Ambiente:
Fernando propõe proteger a Amazônia e permitir que empresas privadas aproveitem 
os seus recursos, desde que apresentem um plano de reflorestamento aprovado pelo 
governo.
Leonardo Coelho da Silva
Leonardo se formou na Universidade de São Paulo, onde estudou contabilidade. 
Depois de completar seus estudos Leonardo trabalhou como contador privado. Após 
decidir se dedicar à vida política, ele trabalhou como chefe de gabinete e como 
gerente de campanha de um deputado estadual em São Paulo. Leonardo também 
trabalhou como consultor de orçamento para o Ministério de Minas e Energia. Ele é 
casado com Ana Carolina e tem dois filhos: David, 11 anos, e Isabel, 7 anos.
Impostos:
Leonardo vai reduzir os impostos a fim de onerar menos as pessoas e estimular a 
economia, mesmo que isso signifique cortar gastos públicos
Saúde:
Leonardo irá fornecer mais incentivos para os prestadores privados de saúde abram 
novos hospitais e clínicas, permitindo que as pessoas tenham acesso a serviços 
privados de qualidade.
Meio Ambiente:
A fim de criar mais empregos e estimular a economia do país, Leonardo propõe dar 
acesso à Amazônia a empresas privadas e estrangeiras.
(a) White Male
Sérgio Augusto Ribeiro
Sérgio é advogado graduado pela Universidade de São Paulo. Após concluir a 
universidade, trabalhou em um escritório de advocacia, antes de decidir dedicar a sua 
vida à política. Desde então, trabalhou no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São 
Paulo, onde serviu como uma ligação entre os legisladores estaduais e os juízes. 
Sérgio também tem trabalhado como agente do Ministério Federal da Justiça. Ele é 
casado com Juliana e tem dois filhos: Thiago, 12 anos, e Renata, 9 anos.
Impostos:
Sérgio vai aumentar os impostos sobre os ricos, a fim de aumentar os gastos 
governamentais em serviços sociais voltados para os pobres
Saúde:
Para assegurar que as pessoas tenham acesso à saúde pública de qualidade, Sérgio 
vai construir novos hospitais e centros de saúde e contratar mais médicos.
Meio Ambiente:
Sérgio pretende proteger a Amazônia, e, ao mesmo tempo, desenvolver um 
programa sustentável para permitir que os pequenos agricultores se beneficiem de 
uma parte da floresta tropical.
Fernando Lopes Damazio
Fernando se formou em economia pela Universidade de Campinas. Desde que 
decidiu seguir uma vida na política, ele trabalha como assessor na Assembléia 
Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo, ajudando a planejar o orçamento do estado. Ele 
também trabalhou para o Ministério da Fazenda como consultor fiscal. Fernando deu 
aulas na Universidade de Brasília. Ele e sua esposa, Viviane têm dois filhos: João, 10 
anos, e Gabriel, 6 anos.
Impostos:
A fim de aumentar os gastos públicos, Fernando pretende aumentar os impostos 
igualmente para todos os cidadãos.
Saúde:
Fernando criará programas de treinamento para médicos e enfermeiros para 
melhorar a qualidade do atendimento.
Meio Ambiente:
Fernando propõe proteger a Amazônia e permitir que empresas privadas aproveitem 
os seus recursos, desde que apresentem um plano de reflorestamento aprovado pelo 
governo.
Leonardo Coelho da Silva
Leonardo se formou na Universidade de São Paulo, onde estudou contabilidade. 
Depois de completar seus estudos Leonardo trabalhou como contador privado. Após 
decidir se dedicar à vida política, ele trabalhou como chefe de gabinete e como 
gerente de campanha de um deputado estadual em São Paulo. Leonardo também 
trabalhou como consultor de orçamento para o Ministério de Minas e Energia. Ele é 
casado com Ana Carolina e tem dois filhos: David, 11 anos, e Isabel, 7 anos.
Impostos:
Leonardo vai reduzir os impostos a fim de onerar menos as pessoas e estimular a 
economia, mesmo que isso signifique cortar gastos públicos
Saúde:
Leonardo irá fornecer mais incentivos para os prestadores privados de saúde abram 
novos hospitais e clínicas, permitindo que as pessoas tenham acesso a serviços 
privados de qualidade.
Meio Ambiente:
A fim de criar mais empregos e estimular a economia do país, Leonardo propõe dar 
acesso à Amazônia a empresas privadas e estrangeiras.
(b) Black Male
Sérgio Augusto Ribeiro
Sérgio é advogado graduado pela Universidade de São Paulo. Após concluir a 
universidade, trabalhou em um escritório de advocacia, antes de decidir dedicar a sua 
vida à política. Desde então, trabalhou no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São 
Paulo, onde serviu como uma ligação entre os legisladores estaduais e os juízes. 
Sérgio também tem trabalhado como agente do Ministério Federal da Justiça. Ele é 
casado com Juliana e tem dois filhos: Thiago, 12 anos, e Renata, 9 anos.
Impostos:
Sérgio vai aumentar os impostos sobre os ricos, a fim de aumentar os gastos 
governamentais em serviços sociais voltados para os pobres
Saúde:
Para assegurar que as pessoas tenham acesso à saúde pública de qualidade, Sérgio 
vai construir novos hospitais e centros de saúde e contratar mais médicos.
Meio Ambiente:
Sérgio pretende proteger a Amazônia, e, ao mesmo tempo, desenvolver um 
programa sustentável para permitir que os pequenos agricultores se beneficiem de 
uma parte da floresta tropical.
Fernanda Lopes Damazio
Fernanda se formou em economia pela Universidade de Campinas. Desde que decidiu 
seguir uma vida na política, ela trabalha como assessora na Assembléia Legislativa do 
Estado de São Paulo, ajudando a planejar o orçamento do estado. Ela também 
trabalhou para o Ministério da Fazenda como consultora fiscal. Fernanda deu aulas 
na Universidade de Brasília. Ela e seu marido, Manoel, têm dois filhos: João, 10 anos, 
e Gabriel, 6 anos.
Impostos:
A fim de aumentar os gastos públicos, Fernanda pretende aumentar os impostos 
igualmente para todos os cidadãos.
Saúde:
Fernanda criará programas de treinamento para médicos e enfermeiros para 
melhorar a qualidade do atendimento.
Meio Ambiente:
Fernanda propõe proteger a Amazônia e permitir que empresas privadas aproveitem 
dos seus recursos, desde que apresentem um plano o reflorestamento aprovado pelo 
governo.
Leonardo Coelho da Silva
Leonardo se formou na Universidade de São Paulo, onde estudou contabilidade. 
Depois de completar seus estudos Leonardo trabalhou como contador privado. Após 
decidir se dedicar à vida política, ele trabalhou como chefe de gabinete e como 
gerente de campanha de um deputado estadual em São Paulo. Leonardo também 
trabalhou como consultor de orçamento para o Ministério de Minas e Energia. Ele é 
casado com Ana Carolina e tem dois filhos: David, 11 anos, e Isabel, 7 anos.
Impostos:
Leonardo vai reduzir os impostos a fim de onerar menos as pessoas e estimular a 
economia, mesmo que isso signifique cortar gastos públicos
Saúde:
Leonardo irá fornecer mais incentivos para os prestadores privados de saúde abram 
novos hospitais e clínicas, permitindo que as pessoas tenham acesso a serviços 
privados de qualidade.
Meio Ambiente:
A fim de criar mais empregos e estimular a economia do país, Leonardo propõe dar 
acesso à Amazônia a empresas privadas e estrangeiras.
(c) White Female
Sérgio Augusto Ribeiro
Sérgio é advogado graduado pela Universidade de São Paulo. Após concluir a 
universidade, trabalhou em um escritório de advocacia, antes de decidir dedicar a sua 
vida à política. Desde então, trabalhou no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São 
Paulo, onde serviu como uma ligação entre os legisladores estaduais e os juízes. 
Sérgio também tem trabalhado como agente do Ministério Federal da Justiça. Ele é 
casado com Juliana e tem dois filhos: Thiago, 12 anos, e Renata, 9 anos.
Impostos:
Sérgio vai aumentar os impostos sobre os ricos, a fim de aumentar os gastos 
governamentais em serviços sociais voltados para os pobres
Saúde:
Para assegurar que as pessoas tenham acesso à saúde pública de qualidade, Sérgio 
vai construir novos hospitais e centros de saúde e contratar mais médicos.
Meio Ambiente:
Sérgio pretende proteger a Amazônia, e, ao mesmo tempo, desenvolver um 
programa sustentável para permitir que os pequenos agricultores se beneficiem de 
uma parte da floresta tropical.
Fernanda Lopes Damazio
Fernanda se formou em economia pela Universidade de Campinas. Desde que decidiu 
seguir uma vida na política, ela trabalha como assessora na Assembléia Legislativa do 
Estado de São Paulo, ajudando a planejar o orçamento do estado. Ela também 
trabalhou para o Ministério da Fazenda como consultora fiscal. Fernanda deu aulas 
na Universidade de Brasília. Ela e seu marido, Manoel, têm dois filhos: João, 10 anos, 
e Gabriel, 6 anos.
Impostos:
A fim de aumentar os gastos públicos, Fernanda pretende aumentar os impostos 
igualmente para todos os cidadãos.
Saúde:
Fernanda criará programas de treinamento para médicos e enfermeiros para 
melhorar a qualidade do atendimento.
Meio Ambiente:
Fernanda propõe proteger a Amazônia e permitir que empresas privadas aproveitem 
dos seus recursos, desde que apresentem um plano o reflorestamento aprovado pelo 
governo.
Leonardo Coelho da Silva
Leonardo se formou na Universidade de São Paulo, onde estudou contabilidade. 
Depois de completar seus estudos Leonardo trabalhou como contador privado. Após 
decidir se dedicar à vida política, ele trabalhou como chefe de gabinete e como 
gerente de campanha de um deputado estadual em São Paulo. Leonardo também 
trabalhou como consultor de orçamento para o Ministério de Minas e Energia. Ele é 
casado com Ana Carolina e tem dois filhos: David, 11 anos, e Isabel, 7 anos.
Impostos:
Leonardo vai reduzir os impostos a fim de onerar menos as pessoas e estimular a 
economia, mesmo que isso signifique cortar gastos públicos
Saúde:
Leonardo irá fornecer mais incentivos para os prestadores privados de saúde abram 
novos hospitais e clínicas, permitindo que as pessoas tenham acesso a serviços 
privados de qualidade.
Meio Ambiente:
A fim de criar mais empregos e estimular a economia do país, Leonardo propõe dar 
acesso à Amazônia a empresas privadas e estrangeiras.
(d) Black Female
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Figure 2: Experimental Ballots Generated by MPH (with English translations)
(a) 3 Candidate Ballot
(b) 6 Candidate Ballot
(c) 12 Candidate Ballot
33
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Dr. George Avelino of the Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas for support and
suggestions, as well as Leonardo Barone, Eduardo Sato, Jaqueline Zulini, Marina Marc¸ola,
and Juliana Bueno for terrific fieldwork and survey implementation. Valuable comments
were also provided by The Brown University Political Science Department Seminar Series,
the Graduate Institute of Geneva Department of Political Science, the University of Zurich’s
Publication Seminar, and CIDE Political Studies Division Seminar Series. Funding was
provided by a UCSD Committee on Research Grant and a Doctoral Dissertation Research
Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-1123236). Replication data
will be made available on the corresponding author’s website upon publication.
34
References
Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow, Scott Desposato and Leonardo Barone. Forthcoming. “Ballot
Structure, Candidate Race, and Vote Choice in Brazil.” Latin American Research Review
.
Alexander, Deborah and Kristi Andersen. 1993. “Gender as a factor in the attribution of
leadership traits.” Political Research Quarterly 46(3):527–545.
Baldez, Lisa. 2004. “Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in
Mexico.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29:231–258. 2.
Burrell, Barbara C. 1995. A Woman’s Place is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in
the Feminist Era. University of Michigan Press.
Cunow, Saul. 2014. “More is Less (Representation): Choice Set Size, Information Acqui-
sition, and Correct Voting in Multimember Districts.” Paper Presented at the Montreal
Voting Experiment Workshop, University of Montreal, March 28-29, 2014 .
Dolan, Kathleen. 1997. “Gender Differences in Support for Women Candidates.” Women &
Politics 17:27–41. 2.
Dolan, Kathleen. 2010. “The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for
Women Candidates.” Political Behavior 32:69–88. 1.
Flannelly, Kevin J. 2002. “Voting for female candidates: Effects of voters’ age, ethnicity,
and gender.” The Journal of social psychology 142(3):397–399.
Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena Krook and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2012. The Impact of Quo-
tas on Women’s Descriptive, Substantive, and Symbolic Representation. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2013. “The temporary importance of role models for women’s political
representation.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, 2013 .
35
Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J. Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. “Causal Inference in
Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Ex-
periments.” Political Analysis 22(1):1–30.
Htun, Mala. 2002. “Puzzles of Women’s Rights in Brazil.” Social Research 69(3):733–751.
Htun, Mala N. and Mark P. Jones. 2002. Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-
making: Electoral Quotas and Women’s Leadership in Latin America. In Gender and
the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Nikki Craske and Maxine
Molyneux. New York: Palgrave pp. 32–56.
Huddy, Leonie and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. “The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for
Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office.” Political Research Quarterly
46:503–525. 3.
Imbens, Guido and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2009. Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Re-
gression Discontinuity Estimator. Working Paper 14726 National Bureau of Economic
Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14726
Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change
around the world. Cambridge University Press.
IPEA. 2014. “Toleraˆncia social a` violeˆncia contra as mulheres.”.
URL: http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/SIPS/140327 sips violencia mulheres.pdf
IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2014. “Women in National Parliaments, World Situation.”.
Jones, Mark P. 1996. “Increasing Women’s Representation via Gender Quotas: The Argen-
tine Ley de Cupos.” Women & Politics 16:75–96.
Jones, Mark P. 1998. “Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women.” Com-
parative Political Studies 31:3–21.
36
Jones, Mark P. 2004. “Quota Legislation and the Election of Women: Learning from the
Costa Rican Experience.” Journal of Politics 66:1203–1223.
Jones, Mark P. 2009. “Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women: Evidence
from the Latin America Vanguard.” Comparative Political Studies 42:56–81. 1.
Jones, Mark P. and Patricio Navia. 1999. “Assessing the Effectiveness of Gender Quotas
in Open—list Proportional Representation Electoral Systems.” Social Science Quarterly
80:341–355.
Kahn, Kim Fridkin and Kim Fridkin. 1996. The political consequences of being a woman:
How stereotypes influence the conduct and consequences of political campaigns. Columbia
University Press.
Koch, Jeffrey W. 1999. “Candidate gender and assessments of senate candidates.” Social
Science Quarterly 80(1):84–96.
Lammers, Joris, Ernestine H. Gordijn and Sabine Otten. 2009. “Iron ladies, men of steel:
The effects of gender stereotyping on the perception of male and female candidates are
moderated by prototypicality.” European Journal of Social Psychology 39:186–195. 2.
Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. “Women, war, and winning elections: Gender stereotyping in the
post-September 11th era.” Political Research Quarterly 57(3):479–490.
McElroy, Gail and Michael Marsh. 2010. “Candidate Gender and Voter Choice: Analysis
from a Multimember Preferential Voting System.” Political Research Quarterly 63:822–
833. 4.
Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2013. “Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Poli-
tics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics.”
American Political Science Review 107(04):644–662.
37
Philpot, Tasha S. and H. Walton Jr. 2007. “One of Our Own: Black Female Candidates and
the Voters Who Support Them.” American Journal of Political Science 51:49–62.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. “Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice.” American Journal of
Political Science 46:20–34. 1.
Schmidt, Gregory D. and Kyle L. Saunders. 2004. “Effective Quotas, Relative Party Magni-
tude, and the Success of Female Candidates: Peruvian Municipal Elections in Comparative
Perspective.” Comparative Political Studies 37:704–724.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., Michael Malecki and Brian F. Crisp. 2010. “Candidate Gender
and Electoral Success in Single Transferable Vote Systems.” British Journal of Political
Science 40(03):693–709.
Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. “When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing
Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring.” American Journal
of Political Science 37:1032–1053.
38
